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8 October 1999
Source: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ai00001.pdf (458K)

GAO 
United States General Accounting Office 

Report to the Chairman, Special 
Committee on the Year 2000 Technology 
Problem, U.S. Senate
 
October 1999 

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION 
Comprehensive Strategy Can Draw on Year 2000 Experiences 

GAO/AIMD-00-1 



Contents 

Letter 3 

Appendixes 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 30 

Appendix II: GAO Reports and Testimonies Addressing 
Information Security Issues Since February 1996 32 

Appendix III: GAO Reports and Testimonies Addressing the 
Year 2000 Challenge 36 

Appendix IV: Risks to Computer-Supported Operations 48 

Appendix V: Examples of Information Security Weaknesses 
Reported by GAO for Federal Agencies During Fiscal Year 
1999 50 

Figure Figure 1: Risks to Computer-Based Operations 7 



Abbreviations 

CIO Chief Information Officer 
DOD Department of Defense 
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 
FISCAM Federal Information System Controls Audit Manual 
ICC Information Coordination Center 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NCS National Communications Systems 
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology 
NIPC National Infrastructure Protection Center 
NSA National Security Agency 
OMB Office of Management and Budget 
OPM Office of Personnel Management 
PDD Presidential Decision Directive 



United States General Accounting Office 
Washington, D.C. 20548 
Accounting and Information 
Management Division 
B-283617 Letter 

October 1, 1999 

The Honorable Robert F. Bennett 
Chairman 
Special Committee on the Year 2000 
Technology Problem 
United States Senate 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

Since the early 1990s, an explosion in computer interconnectivity, most 
notably growth in use of the Internet, has revolutionized the way our 
government, our nation, and much of the world communicate and conduct 
business. The benefits have been enormous. Vast amounts of information 
are now literally at our fingertips, facilitating research on virtually every 
topic imaginable; financial and other business transactions can be 
executed almost instantaneously, often on a 24-hour-a-day basis; and 
electronic mail, Internet websites, and computer bulletin boards allow us 
to communicate quickly and easily with a virtually unlimited number of 
other individuals and groups. However, in addition to its benefits, this 
widespread interconnectivity poses enormous risks to our computer 
systems and, more importantly, to the critical operations and 
infrastructures they support, such as telecommunications; power 
distribution; national defense, including the military's warfighting 
capability; law enforcement; government services; and emergency services. 

Recent efforts to address the Year 2000 computing problem have called 
attention to some important aspects of these risks. In particular, the Year 
2000 problem has highlighted computer-based interdependencies and the 
vulnerability of these systems to disruption. It also has underscored the 
need to develop awareness, cooperation, and a disciplined management 
approach to adequately address such problems. In many ways, the Year 
2000 challenge can be viewed as a major test of our nation's ability to 
protect its computer-supported critical infrastructures; although, 
protecting critical infrastructures from hostile attacks on a continuous 
basis will require addressing a much broader array of issues. 

This report responds to your request that we (1) summarize our recent 
findings on computer security and critical infrastructure protection and 
(2) identify preliminary lessons learned from the Year 2000 date conversion 
experience that can benefit critical infrastructure protection efforts. It is 
based both on reports we issued during 1997 and 1998 and the first 9 
months of 1999 and on recent discussions with key officials involved in the 
Year 2000 conversion efforts and critical infrastructure protection. 
Appendix I contains a more detailed description of our objectives, scope, 
and methodology. Appendix II lists our reports and testimonies that 
address information security, and appendix III lists our reports and 
testimonies that address the Year 2000 challenge.
 
Results in Brief 

Our nation's computer-based critical infrastructures are at increasing risk 
of severe disruption. Interconnectivity increases the risk that problems 
affecting one system will also affect other interconnected systems. Massive 
computer networks provide pathways among systems that, if not properly 
secured, can be used to gain unauthorized access to data and operations 
from remote locations. While the threats or sources of these problems can 
include natural disasters, such as earthquakes, and system-induced 
problems, such as the Year 2000 date conversion problem, government 
officials are increasingly concerned about attacks from individuals and 
groups with malicious intentions, such as terrorists and nations engaging in 
information warfare. 

The resultant damage can vary, depending on the threat. Critical system 
operations can be disrupted or otherwise sabotaged, sensitive data can be 
read and copied, and data or processes can be tampered with. A significant 
concern is that terrorists or hostile foreign states could launch computer- 
based attacks on critical systems, such as those supporting energy 
distribution, telecommunications, and financial services, to severely 
damage or disrupt our national defense or other operations, resulting in 
harm to the public welfare. Understanding these risks to our computer- 
based critical infrastructures and determining how best to mitigate them 
are major information security challenges. 

The need to strengthen computer security in both government and the 
private sector has been recognized over the past few years by a number of 
entities, and several initial steps have been taken to address the problem. 
Since 1994, we have issued dozens of reports on individual agency 
computer security weaknesses and made scores of related 
recommendations. In September 1996, we reported that poor information 
security was a widespread federal problem.(1) Subsequently, in February 
1997, in a series of reports to the Congress, we designated information 
security as a new governmentwide high-risk area.(2) 

  ----------
  1 Information Security: Opportunities for Improved OMB Oversight of Agency Practices 
  (GAO/AIMD-96-110, September 24, 1996). 

  2 High Risk Series: Information Management andTechnology (GAO/HR-97-9, February 1997). 
  ----------

During 1996 and 1997, federal information security was addressed by the 
President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, which had 
been established to investigate our nation's vulnerability to both ``cyber'' 
and physical threats. In its October 1997 report, Critical Foundations: 
Protecting America's Infrastructures, the Commission described the 
potentially devastating implications of poor information security from a 
national perspective. These efforts were supplemented in late 1997 when 
the federal Chief Information Officers (CIO) Council designated 
information security as one of six priority areas and established a Security 
Committee, which has taken steps to promote awareness, improve agency 
access to incident response services, and support agency improvement 
efforts. 

In May 1998, Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 63 recognized that 
addressing computer-based risks to our nation's critical infrastructures 
requires a new approach that involves coordination and cooperation across 
federal agencies and among public and private-sector entities and other 
nations. PDD 63 created several new entities for developing and 
implementing a strategy for critical infrastructure protection. In addition, it 
tasked federal agencies with developing critical infrastructure protection 
plans and establishing related links with private industry sectors. Since 
then, a variety of activities have been undertaken, including development 
and review of individual agency's critical infrastructure protection plans, 
identification and evaluation of information security standards and best 
practices, and efforts to build communication links with the private sector. 

However, the details of an approach for implementing PDD 63 are still 
being developed. In particular, the first version of a key element called for 
in PDD 63---development of a national plan for critical infrastructure 
protection---has not been completed. As a result, it is not clear how the 
activities undertaken to date interrelate and whether they will effectively 
and efficiently support national goals. As of late August, those involved in 
developing the plan expected it to be issued in late October of this year. 

As the plan is finalized and discussed, a number of issues will need to be 
resolved, including those regarding the federal government's role in critical 
infrastructure protection and how best to balance potentially competing 
demands for security versus privacy. Many of these issues are different 
from those associated with the Year 2000 challenge. However, it is 
important that our government take advantage of the experience it has 
gained and is continuing to gain in addressing the Year 2000 challenge as it 
strives to reduce the risk associated with longer-term threats to our critical 
infrastructures. Although it is too early to identify a comprehensive set of 
lessons learned, some factors provide preliminary insights into the 
challenge ahead. In particular, the Year 2000 experience has provided a 
foundation for improvement and has already clearly shown the value of 

. high-level congressional and executive branch leadership, 
. understanding risks to computer-supported operations, 
. providing adequate technical expertise, 
. providing standard guidance, 
. establishing public-private sector relationships, 
. facilitating progress and monitoring performance, 
. developing an incident identification and coordination capability, and 
. implementing fundamental information technology management 
improvements. 

Risks to Computer-Dependent Operations Are Substantial 

The risks associated with our nation's reliance on interconnected computer 
systems are substantial and varied. The Year 2000 challenge has vividly 
illustrated the risks posed by a widespread system-induced computing 
problem. However, numerous other threats will continue to pose risks long 
after the Year 2000 problem has been resolved. Some, similar to the Year 
2000 problem, could cause severe disruption, while others more directly 
threaten the confidentiality or integrity of data. The following diagram 
provides an overview of the various types of risks. A more detailed 
description, based on a list compiled by the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST), is in appendix IV. 

Figure 1: Risks to Computer-Based Operations 
####### 
Hostile 
States 
Spies/ 
Snoops 
User 
Error 
Natural 
Disasters Pranksters 
Saboteurs 
######### ###### 
Sensitive 
Data 
Disclosed 
Consumer 
& Taxpayer 
Confidence 
Lost 
Critical 
Operations 
Halted 
Services & 
Benefits 
Interrupted 
Assets 
Lost 
Integrity of 
Data & Reports 
Corrupted 
Systems Supporting Critical Operations 
Fraud 
Terrorists 
Criminals 

While complete summary data are not available because many computer 
security incidents are not reported, the number of incidents is clearly 
growing. For example, the number of reported incidents handled by 
Carnegie-Mellon University's CERT Coordination Center(3) has increased 
from 1,334 in 1993 to 4,398 during the first two quarters of 1999. Similarly, 
the fourth annual survey conducted by the Computer Security Institute in 
cooperation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) showed an 
increase in computer system intrusions for the third year in a row. In 1999, 
30 percent of 521 respondents from both the private and public sectors 
reported such attacks.(4) 

  ----------
  3 Originally called the Computer Emergency Response Team, the center was established in 
  1988 by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. It is charged with (1) establishing 
  a capability to quickly and effectively coordinate communication among experts in order to 
  limit the damage associated with, and respond to, incidents and (2) building awareness of 
  security issues across the Internet community. 

  4 Issues and Trends: 1999 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey, announced 
  March 1999. 

  ----------

Many incidents appear to be unrelated and result in relatively limited 
damage. However, a widespread, well-organized attack could severely 
disrupt or damage critical systems that are essential to our national 
defense, economic prosperity, and quality of life. 

In the federal government, these risks are not being adequately addressed. 
Tests and evaluations of federal systems show that these systems are not 
being effectively protected, even though they process, store, and transmit 
enormous amounts of sensitive data and are indispensable to many federal 
agency operations. 

Even greater concerns have been raised about the security of private sector 
systems, which control most of our nation's critical infrastructures, such as 
energy, telecommunications, financial services, transportation, and vital 
human services. Virtually all U.S. residents and businesses rely on these 
infrastructures, including government operations. One cause of concern is 
that although there are numerous reports of individual system intrusions 
and failures, there is little summary information that can be used to more 
accurately estimate the risk. Few reports are publicly available about the 
effectiveness of controls over privately controlled systems, and private 
entities are reluctant to disclose known problems or vulnerabilities that 
might weaken their competitive positions or diminish customer confidence 
in their services or products. 

In order to determine adequate levels of protection to safeguard our critical 
infrastructures, it will be important to gain a more thorough understanding 
of the related risks. This will be an ongoing effort due to fast-paced changes 
in computer technology and in the tools and techniques available to would- 
be intruders. As these risks are assessed, it will be important to consider 
that the computer security improvements that would guard against 
purposeful, hostile attacks on critical infrastructures could also provide 
other benefits that would allow our nation and others to take further 
advantage of computer technology. In particular, improved security would 
provide businesses and individuals greater confidence in the integrity and 
confidentiality of computerized information. Such confidence would be 
likely to increase people's willingness to engage in electronic commerce 
and have confidential data, such as financial and medical records, 
maintained and transmitted electronically. 

Risks to Federal Operations 

Federal operations, such as national defense, tax collection, law 
enforcement, air traffic control, and benefit payments are at risk of 
disruption, as well as fraud and inappropriate disclosures, due to a variety 
of security weaknesses associated with the computers on which such 
operations depend. Organized attacks, such as the ``Solar Sunrise'' attack 
on Department of Defense (DOD) and other computers in early 1998, and 
widespread computer virus infections, such as the Melissa virus in early 
1999, illustrate our government's susceptibility to malicious computer- 
based actions. 

According to the DOD, Solar Sunrise was a series of attacks during 
February 1998 that targeted its servers by exploiting a well-known 
vulnerability in the Solaris operating system. The attacks were widespread 
and systematic and showed a pattern that indicated they might be the 
preparation for a coordinated attack on DOD's i nformation infrastructure. 
They were of particular concern because they targeted key parts of DOD's 
networks at a time when it was preparing for possible military operations 
against Iraq. As we testified in April 1999,(5) the Melissa virus affected 
Microsoft word processing software. Although the Melissa virus disrupted 
5 Information Security: The Melissa Computer Virus Demonstrates Urgent Need for Stronger 
Protection Over Systems and Sensitive Data(GAO/T-AIMD-99-146, April 15, 1999). 
operations at thousands of companies and some government agencies, it 
reportedly did not compromise sensitive government data. However, it 
illustrated the speed with which malicious software can spread in today's 
interconnected computing environment. 

  ----------

  5 Information Security: The Melissa Computer Virus Demonstrates Urgent Need for Stronger 
  Protection Over Systems and Sensitive Data(GAO/T-AIMD-99-146, April 15, 1999). 

  ----------

Audit reports we and agency inspectors general issued during fiscal year 
1999 show that 22 of the largest federal agencies have significant computer 
security weaknesses---which closely mirrors a finding we reported in 
September 1998.(6) Reports we issued during the past year describe risks to 
operations and assets at the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration and the Departments of Defense, Agriculture, and Treasury. 
Appendix V provides more detailed descriptions of these weaknesses. 
These recent reports supplement a body of evidence on federal computer 
security problems at individual agencies that we have compiled since 1996. 
These reports have provided scores of recommendations for improvement. 
In addition, we have issued several summary reports that provide a more 
comprehensive view of the problem and illustrate the need for concerted 
improvement efforts. 

. In September 1996, we reported that since September 1994, serious 
weaknesses had been reported for 10 of the largest 15 federal agencies.(7) 
In that report we concluded that poor information security was a 
widespread federal problem with potentially devastating consequences, 
and we recommended that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
play a more proactive role in overseeing agency practices and managing 
improvements. 

. In February 1997 and again in January 1999, our reports to the Congress 
designated information security as a governmentwide high-risk area.(8)

. In our March 1998 and March 1999 reports on the federal government's 
consolidated financial statements, we reported that widespread and 
serious computer control weaknesses place enormous amounts of 
federal assets at risk of fraud and misuse, financial data at risk of 
unauthorized modification or destruction, sensitive information at risk 
of inappropriate disclosure, and critical operations at risk of disruption.(9)

. In September 1998, we reported that critical federal operations were at 
risk of disruption, fraud, and inappropriate disclosure due to 
weaknesses in every major federal agency.(10) 

  ---------- 
  6 Information Security: Serious Weaknesses Place Critical Federal Operations and Assets at 
  Risk (GAO/AIMD-98-92, September 23, 1998). 

  7 Information Security: Opportunities for Improved OMB Oversight of Agency Practices 
  (GAO/AIMD-96-110, September 24, 1996). 

  8 High Risk Series: Information Management andTechnology (GAO/HR-97-9, February 1997) 
  and High Risk Series: An Update (GAO/HR-99-1, January 1999). 

  9 Financial Audit: 1997 Consolidated Financial Statements of the United States Government 
  (GAO/AIMD-98-127, March 31, 1998) and Financial Audit: 1998 Financial Statements of the 
  United States Government (GAO/AIMD-99-130, March 31, 1999). 

  10 Information Security: Serious Weaknesses Place Critical Federal Operations and Assets at 
  Risk (GAO/AIMD-98-92, September 23, 1998). 

  ----------

In both our September 1996 and September 1998 reports and in testimony 
before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs in September 1998,(11)
we concluded that an underlying cause of weak information security at 
federal agencies was that agency officials had not instituted a basic cycle of 
management procedures for ensuring that risks are fully understood and 
that controls implemented to mitigate risks are effective.(12) Our subsequent 
audits have continued to support this conclusion. In particular, many 
agencies are not adequately (1) assessing risks, (2) using the results of such 
assessments to select controls, (3) promoting awareness, (4) evaluating 
control effectiveness, and (5) coordinating their security program through 
a central agency focal point. 

  ----------

  11 Information Security: Strengthened Management Needed to Protect Critical Federal 
  Operations and Assets (GAO/T-AIMD-98-312, September 23, 1998). 

  12 See footnotes 6 and 7, respectively. 

  ----------

Our September 1996 and September 1998 reports also concluded that more 
effective actions were needed at the governmentwide level. In September 
1998, we recognized efforts by OMB, NIST, the federal Chief Information 
Officers (CIO) Council, and the then newly initiated critical infrastructure 
protection efforts called for by PDD 63, but we also stated that a 
comprehensive governmentwide strategy was needed. We noted that the 
new entities and responsibilities prescribed by PDD 63 supplemented 
existing security requirements prescribed in the Paperwork Reduction Act 
of 1980, OMB Circular A-130, Appendix III, the Computer Security Act, the 
Clinger-Cohen Act, and the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act, as 
well as information security initiatives underway at organizations such as 
the CIO Council. We said that many of the existing organizations and those 
created by PDD 63 appeared to have overlapping objectives and that, 
accordingly, it was especially important that a governmentwide strategy be 
developed that clearly defined and coordinated the roles of new and 
existing federal entities in order to avoid inappropriate duplication of effort 
and ensure governmentwide cooperation and support. 

Specifically, we recommended that the Director of OMB and the Assistant 
to the President for National Security Affairs ensure that the various 
existing and newly initiated efforts to improve federal information security 
are coordinated under a comprehensive strategy. We suggested that such a 
strategy 

. ensure that executive agencies are carrying out the responsibilities 
outlined in laws and regulations requiring them to protect the security of 
their information resources; 

. clearly delineate the roles of the various federal organizations with 
responsibilities related to information security; 

. identify and rank the most significant information security issues facing 
federal agencies; 

. promote information security risk awareness among senior agency 
officials whose critical operations rely on automated systems; 

. identify and promote proven security tools, techniques, and 
management best practices; 

. ensure the adequacy of information technology workforce skills; 

. ensure that the security of both financial and nonfinancial systems is 
adequately evaluated on a regular basis; 

. include long-term goals and objectives, including time frames, priorities, 
and annual performance goals; and 

. provide for periodically evaluating agency performance from a 
governmentwide perspective and acting to address shortfalls. 

In November 1998, key officials in OMB, the National Security Council, the 
FBI, the CIO Council, and the Year 2000 Office held a joint meeting and 
assured us that they were coordinating their efforts. Since then, we have 
observed many instances of cooperation and joint efforts. However, a 
strategy for improving federal information security has not yet been clearly 
articulated. 

Broader Risks to Critical Infrastructures 

While the federal government has traditionally focused on the security of 
its own systems, there has been a growing realization in recent years that 
our national welfare, including government services and national defense, 
depends to a large extent on systems supporting privately controlled 
infrastructures. This concern has been emphasized by the Year 2000 
challenge as many agencies and private-sector organizations have been 
forced to recognize their dependence on computer systems beyond their 
span of control. Over the past few years, such risks and the need to adjust 
the way we view and protect our nation's information systems have been 
described in a variety of reports and testimonies before the Congress. The 
following chronology provides an overview of this growing concern. 

. A 1994 Joint Security Commission report warned that computer 
networks are ``a battlefield of the future'' and that the risk was not 
limited to military systems. According to the Commission, if an enemy 
attacked our unprotected civilian infrastructure (for example, the public 
telephone system), the economic and other results could be 
disastrous.(13)

. In 1996, the Director of Central Intelligence stated that there is evidence 
that ``a number of countries are developing the doctrine, strategies, and 
tools to conduct information attacks'' and that ``international terrorists 
groups clearly have the capability to attack the information 
infrastructure of the United States.'' The Director's greatest concern was 
that hackers, terrorists, or other nations could use information warfare 
techniques as part of a coordinated attack to seriously disrupt electric 
power distribution, air traffic control, or financial sectors.(14) 

. In October 1997, the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure 
Protection issued a comprehensive report on our nation's computer- 
related vulnerabilities that described the potentially devastating 
implications of poor information security from a national perspective.(15)

. In March 1998, the Chief of the National Infrastructure Protection 
Center (NIPC), Federal Bureau of Investigation, testified that 
``transnational criminals are rapidly becoming aware of and exploiting 
the power of cyber tools'' and that recent computer crimes illustrate 
``the growing problem of cyber crime, the international dimension of the 
problem, and the increasing threat to our critical infrastructure.'' 
According to the Chief, one example that illustrates the growing 
problem is the 1994 case where foreign crime groups hacked into a 
major financial service company's cash management system and 
attempted transfers totaling $10 million.(16)

. In releasing a December 1998 report on ``cyberwarfare'' and crime 
prepared by a panel of current and former U.S. national security 
officials, former FBI and Central Intelligence Agency Director William 
Webster stated that ``it is time for us to recognize that we have a range of 
enemies today, not only military enemies, but criminals and terrorists 
and others who have the same capabilities to do major damage to the 
infrastructure upon which we all depend.''(17)

. In May 1998, the President, through PDD 63, directed that a national 
plan on infrastructure protection be developed and addressed a range of 
other infrastructure protection issues.

. In June 1998 and in February 1999, the Director for Central Intelligence 
testified that several nations recognize that cyber attacks against 
civilian computer systems represent an option they could use to ``level 
the playing field'' during an armed crisis against the United States, and 
they are developing information warfare capabilities. He added that 
terrorists and others were beginning to recognize that information 
warfare offers them ``low cost, easily hidden tools to support their 
causes.''(18)

. In March 1999, the National Communications Systems (NCS), an 
interagency committee formed to examine communication networks 
and institute change, reported that adversaries could disrupt, disable, or 
collect sensitive data through coordinated attacks on U.S. computer 
systems and that organized crime groups are targeting such systems to 
commit fraud, acquire and exploit proprietary information, and steal 
funds and securities transmitted through electronic commerce 
systems.''(19) 

  ----------

  13 Redefining Security , A Report to the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central 
  Intelligence from the Joint Security Commission, February 28, 1994. 

  14 Statement for the Record by the Director of Central Intelligence to the U.S. Senate 
  Committee on Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, ``Foreign 
  Information Warfare Programs and Capabilities,'' June 25, 1996. 

  15 Critical Foundations: Protecting America's Infrastructures, The Report of the President's 
  Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, October 1997. 

  16 Statement for the Record, Deputy Assistant Director and Chief, National Infrastructure 
  Protection Center, Federal Bureau of Investigation, before the Congressional Joint 
  Economic Committee, March 24, 1998. 

  17 Cybercrime, Cyberterrorism, and Cyberwarfare: Averting an Electronic Waterloo , The 
  Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 15, 1999. 

  18 Testimony by Director for Central Intelligence before the Senate Committee on 
  Governmental Affairs, June 24, 1998, and before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
  February 2, 1999.

  19 The Electronic Intrusion Threat to National Security and Emergency Preparedness 
  (NS/EP) Telecommunications: An Awareness Document, Third Edition, National 
  Communications System, March 1999. 

  ----------

These reports and statements have focused attention on the issues 
associated with infrastructure protection, particularly vulnerabilities to 
critical operations and our national defense. They have also prompted the 
start of a national debate regarding the appropriate mix of public and 
private actions and types of mechanisms needed to better define and 
address these risks. 

Critical Infrastructure Protection Requires a New Approach 

As the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection 
recognized in its October 1997 report, mitigating the shared risks resulting 
from our computer-based interdependencies will require shared, or jointly 
developed, solutions. Just as it is no longer satisfactory for individual 
organizations to address their computer security risks solely on a system- 
by-system basis, neither can individual organizations fully protect their 
operations without considering risks associated with systems they use or 
depend on that are controlled by others. Such systems can include those of 
business partners, public utilities, and government entities---in essence, 
any system on which an organization relies for essential services, 
information, or business transactions. 

In response to the Commission's report, the executive branch initiated 
efforts to implement a cooperative public-private approach to protecting 
our critical infrastructures by issuing PDD 63 in May 1998. PDD 63 calls for 
a range of actions intended to improve federal agency security programs, 
establish a partnership between the government and the private sector, and 
improve our nation's ability to detect and respond to serious attacks. As 
described previously, to accomplish these goals, the directive 
(1) established a National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure 
Protection and Counter-Terrorism who is to report to the President through 
the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and (2) created 
new entities within the Department of Commerce and the FBI. In addition, 
it assigned agencies new responsibilities for coordinating with industry 
sectors and developing critical infrastructure protection plans. 

A central requirement of PDD 63 is development of a National 
Infrastructure Assurance Plan. As of late August 1999, officials involved in 
developing the plan estimated that it would be issued in late October 1999. 
Such a plan is important because it can provide a roadmap to guide the 
activities of the many federal entities involved in critical infrastructure 
protection. In particular the plan can provide for 

. defining and ranking risks to help ensure that attention and resources 
are focused on reducing the most significant vulnerabilities, 

. designating roles and responsibilities, 

. developing a plan of action for addressing the most significant risks 
first, and 

. monitoring progress and measuring performance. 

Defining and Ranking Risks 

PDD 63 identified industry sectors and federal agencies that are important 
to critical infrastructure protection. However, a more detailed analysis is 
needed to determine the greatest specific risks, the most critical systems 
and interdependencies, and the improvement efforts that merit the earliest 
and greatest attention. Such an analysis and identification of risk needs to 
be done within individual organizations and agencies as well as across 
industry groups and government agencies in order to identify critical 
interdependencies. Without a prioritized lists of such factors, or a plan for 
developing such information, it will not be possible to determine what 
protective actions are needed and which should be undertaken first. 

Designating Roles and Responsibilities 

Many agencies have responsibilities related to computer security that 
overlap somewhat with new critical infrastructure protection initiatives. 
For example, under current laws, federal agencies are primarily 
responsible for adequately securing their own operations, OMB is 
responsible for overseeing and coordinating federal agency security, and 
NIST with assistance from the National Security Agency (NSA) is 
responsible for establishing related standards. In addition, since its 
establishment in 1996, the CIO Council has undertaken activities in this 
area. It is important that the roles of these organizations as they relate to 
critical infrastructure protection be well defined and coordinated with 
those of newer entities established by PDD 63 within the National Security 
Council, the Department of Commerce, and the FBI. 

Developing a Plan of Action 

Once specific risks and interdependencies have been identified and ranked, 
an action plan can be developed to address them. To be most effective, 
such a plan should define specific objectives, estimate needed resources, 
and provide a schedule of activities. 

During the 15 months since PDD63's issuance, a variety of activities have 
begun. Twenty-one federal agencies, identified as the most important to 
critical infrastructure protection, have submitted critical infrastructure 
protection plans and received at least one round of comments from an 
expert review team managed by the Critical Infrastructure Assurance 
Office, which was established by PDD 63 in the Department of Commerce. 
In addition, the General Services Administration, OMB, the CIO Council, 
NIST, and others have either engaged in cooperative efforts with the 
entities established by PDD 63 or reoriented or supplemented ongoing 
activities to support PDD 63 goals. Examples include the following: 

. The CIO Council's security committee created a sub-group for providing 
input on critical infrastructure protection efforts. 

. The Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office is assisting in establishing 
the Information Coordination Center, which will monitor events 
surrounding January 1, 2000. 

. NIST and NSA are leading an effort to identify and evaluate standards 
and best practices for information security. 

. The FBI established the National Infrastructure Protection Center, in 
1998, to facilitate and coordinate the federal government's investigation 
and response to attacks on critical infrastructures. 

However, these efforts are not yet being coordinated under a 
comprehensive plan. As a result, there is a risk that these efforts will be 
unfocused, inefficient, and ineffective. For example, the CIO Council 
Security Committee and a recently established working group both have 
efforts underway to identify standards and best practices that could 
improve federal agency efforts. While such efforts are generally laudable, it 
is unclear how the guidance that may result from them will relate to 
guidance issued by NIST and policies issued by OMB, two organizations 
that have statutory responsibilities in these areas. 

Monitoring Progress and Measuring Performance 

Once a plan of action has been developed and agreed on, it must be 
implemented. Ensuring effective implementation will require monitoring 
and evaluation to determine if milestones are being met and testing to 
determine if measures to protect critical infrastructures are operating as 
intended. 

Evaluations at several levels can be beneficial. A program to periodically 
test and evaluate agency controls would provide agency managers with the 
information they need to determine if controls are operating effectively on 
an ongoing basis and whether adjustments to agency policies and 
procedures are needed. Evaluations by agency inspectors general or 
outside auditors can serve as an independent check on management 
evaluations. However, the emphasis should be on evaluations initiated by 
management, since computer security is a fundamental, ongoing 
management responsibility. Summary evaluations performed by entities 
such as OMB, GAO, or the CIO Council can provide a governmentwide view 
of progress and help identify crosscutting problems. 

Year 2000 Efforts Provide Important Insights for Critical Infrastructure 
Protection 

While the challenge of protecting our critical infrastructures is different in 
many ways from addressing the Year 2000 challenge, there are significant 
similarities. Critical infrastructure protection will raise many issues beyond 
those raised in addressing the Year 2000 problem, such as those pertaining 
to the role of government in ensuring protection of privately controlled 
infrastructures and how best to balance security needs with business and 
individual privacy. However, both challenges involve threats to critical 
computer-dependent operations, and both require actions by and 
cooperation among public and private sector entities. 

While it is too early to comprehensively identify lessons learned from the 
Year 2000 conversion efforts, we identified a number of factors from the 
Year 2000 experience that are relevant to longer term critical infrastructure 
protection and provide insights into the challenges ahead. In some areas, 
the Year 2000 problem has laid a foundation for longer term improvements 
in the way we view, manage, and protect computer systems supporting our 
nation's critical infrastructures. These areas include 

. providing high-level congressional and executive branch leadership, 

. understanding risks to computer-supported operations, 

. providing adequate technical expertise, 

. providing standard guidance, 

. establishing public-private sector relationships, 

. facilitating progress and monitoring performance, 

. developing an incident identification and coordination capability, and 

. implementing fundamental information technology management 
improvements. 

These factors, which are discussed below, should be considered when 
developing a national strategy for critical infrastructure protection. 

Providing Congressional and Executive Branch Leadership 

One of the most important factors in prompting attention and action on the 
Year 2000 problem has been proactive leadership at the highest levels of 
government. In February 1998, the President signed an executive order 
establishing the President's Council on Year 2000 Conversion, chaired by an 
Assistant to the President and consisting of one representative from each 
of the executive departments and from other federal agencies as may be 
determined by the chair. The Council has focused attention on the problem 
and provided a forum for high-level communication among leaders in 
government, the private sector, and the international community. A similar 
entity, the Critical Infrastructure Coordination Group, was established by 
PDD 63. However, as yet, it has not had the same level of visibility as the 
Council on Year 2000 Conversion or as broad a level of agency 
participation. 

In addition to executive branch leadership, congressional leadership has 
been important in addressing the Year 2000 challenge and can serve as a 
model for long-term critical infrastructure protection. The Senate formed a 
Special Committee on the Year 2000 Technology Problem, which held 
numerous hearings on the readiness of key economic sectors, including 
power, health care, telecommunications, transportation, financial services, 
emergency services, and general business. Similarly, the House called on 
the Subcommittee on Government Management, Information and 
Technology of the Committee on Government Reform and the 
Subcommittee on Technology of the Committee on Science to co-chair the 
House's Year 2000 monitoring. These and other congressional committees 
and subcommittees have played a central role in addressing the Year 2000 
challenge by holding agencies accountable for demonstrating progress and 
by heightening public appreciation of the problem. 

Understanding Risks 

According to officials involved in Year 2000 conversion efforts, the Year 
2000 challenge has served as a wake-up call to many who were previously 
unaware of our nation's extensive dependency on computers. This new 
awareness of the importance of computer systems and of the 
vulnerabilities of these systems can serve as a basis for better 
understanding long-term risks to computer-supported critical 
infrastructures. In addition, Year 2000 efforts have forced agencies to 
identify those systems that are mission-critical. 

At the governmentwide level, OMB identified 43 high-impact programs and 
designated a lead agency for each program. Each lead agency was directed 
to identify the partners integral to program delivery and take a lead role in 
convening those partners and ensuring that they had adequate Year 2000 
plans. For those without plans, agencies were to help develop a plan to 
ensure that the related program would operate effectively. 
These are important first steps for critical infrastructure protection 
because they provide organizations, industry groups, and government 
sectors a basis for helping to ensure that their most significant risks are 
addressed first. However, unlike the Year 2000 problem, critical 
infrastructure protection will be an ongoing challenge. Because risks and 
related system priorities change over time, as do the techniques for 
mitigating risks, infrastructure protection will require organizations to 
institutionalize the practices of inventorying and prioritizing their systems 
through periodic risk assessments. Our recent study of information 
security risk assessment practices at leading organizations provides 
guidance that agencies can use to develop a practical risk assessment 
program.(20) 

  ----------

  20 Information Security Risk Assessment: Practices of Leading Organizations (Exposure 
  Draft) (GAO/AIMD-99-139, August 1999). 

  ----------

Providing Adequate Technical Expertise 

In April 1998, we noted that some agencies were reporting problems 
obtaining and retaining personnel with the technical expertise needed to 
accomplish Year 2000 conversions. Accordingly, we recommended that the 
Council for Year 2000 Conversion develop a personnel strategy that would 
include reemploying former federal employees and identifying ways to 
retain key Year 2000 staff.(21) In October 1998, we reported that several 
efforts had been undertaken to address these workforce issues.(22) Some of 
these illustrate the types of creative solutions that can be considered to 
solve specific personnel problems. Others serve as a basis for further 
improvements that could benefit critical infrastructure protection, as well 
as other information technology management issues. 

To address information technology workforce shortages that agencies said 
were impeding their ability to make Year 2000 conversions, the Office of 
Personnel Management (OPM) publicized existing tools for retaining staff 
and supplemented these with additional aids. The tools that were 
publicized included 

. providing authority to reemploy federal retirees to work specifically on 
the Year 2000 conversion without the usually required reduction in the 
retiree's salary or military annuity; 

. encouraging agency heads to exercise their authority to make 
exceptions to limitations on premium pay (including overtime, night, 
and holiday pay) for employees performing emergency work to resolve 
computer system problems associated with the Year 2000 that posed a 
direct threat to life and property; 

. allowing agencies, in certain circumstances and with OPM approval, to 
exclude criticalYear 2000 positions from voluntary early retirement 
programs; and 

. allowing agencies to authorize a retention allowance of up to 10 percent 
of an employee's rate of basic pay (or up to 25 percent with OPM 
approval) for a group or category of employees such as computer 
programmers and system engineers that meet certain criteria, such as 
being likely to leave federal service in the absence of the allowance. 

  ----------

  21 Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Potential for Widespread Disruption Calls for Strong 
  Leadership and Partnerships (GAO/AIMD-98-85, April 30, 1998). 

  22 Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Status of Efforts to Deal With Personnel Issues 
  (GAO/AIMD/GGD-99-14, October 22, 1998). 

  ----------

In addition, as we reported in October 1998, the Year 2000 Conversion 
Council took several steps to address personnel shortages from a 
nationwide perspective. These included (1) establishing an Internet site to 
link information technology workers with the companies that need them to 
solve the Year 2000 problem and (2) surveying community colleges to 
determine the effect of workforce issues on local communities. 
Perhaps most importantly for the long term and prompted in part by 
concerns over technical staff shortages affecting Year 2000 efforts, the CIO 
Council, in March 1998, tasked its Education and Training committee with 
crafting recommendations for actions to help agencies recruit and retain 
information technology personnel. The final report was issued in June 
1999, generally too late to provide substantive support for the Year 2000 
efforts. However, the report provides an extensive description of the 
current status of federal information technology employment, 
improvement efforts currently underway, and detailed proposals for action 
that are associated with 13 major recommendations. In this regard, the 
report provides a useful basis for improving the federal information 
technology workforce as a whole, including that segment needed to 
support critical infrastructure protection efforts. 

Providing Standard Guidance 

Standard guidance that was universally accepted, adopted, and 
implemented has facilitatedYear 2000 conversion efforts and related 
oversight. In particular, guidance issued from 1997 through 1999 by GAO, 
OMB, and the CIO Council has 

. provided a level of consistency across government by providing 
standard terms, tools, and techniques based on best practices; 

. imposed structure and discipline; 

. increased the rigor of testing and assessment efforts; 

. promoted consistency in data gathering and reporting; and 

. facilitated audit and evaluation efforts by both agency management and 
auditors. 

To help agencies mitigate their Year 2000 risks, we produced a series of 
Year 2000 guides that were adopted by OMB. The first of these, on 
enterprise readiness, provides a systematic, step-by-step approach for 
agency planning and management of itsYear 2000 program.(23) The second, 
on business continuity and contingency planning, provides a structured 
approach to helping agencies ensure minimum levels of service through 
proper planning.(24) Our third guide sets forth a disciplined approach to Year 
2000 testing.(25) Federal agencies and other organizations have used these 
guides extensively to help organize and manage theirYear 2000 programs. 
In addition, an interagency working group (which later evolved into the 
CIO Council's Year 2000 Committee) developed a best practices guide for 
Year 2000 conversion and made it available on the World Wide Web. 

  ----------

  23 Year 2000 Computing Crisis: An Assessment Guide (GAO/AIMD-10.1.14, issued as an 
  exposure draft in February 1997 and in final form in September 1997). 

  24 Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Business Continuity and Contingency Planning(GAO/AIMD- 
  10.1.19, issued as an exposure draft in March 1998 and in final form in August 1998). 

  25 Year 2000 Computing Crisis: A Testing Guide (GAO/AIMD-10.1.21, issued as an exposure 
  draft in June 1998 and in final form in November 1998). 

  ----------

Similar guides could be developed for critical infrastructure protection. 
These could be based to a large extent on existing guides pertaining to 
various aspects of computer security. For example, since May 1998, we 
have issued two guides on information security management and risk 
assessment practices that can be applied to critical infrastructure 
protection as well as a broader range of information security risks. 
In addition, since May 1997, OMB has provided agencies with instructions 
on reporting on their quarterly Year 2000 progress. These instructions 
covered items such as Year 2000 remediation progress, data exchanges, and 
costs. OMB periodically updated these instructions to request that agencies 
provide additional information on key topics such as verification actions or 
to clarify existing reporting requirements. 

Establishing Public-Private Sector Relationships 

Like the Year 2000 problem, the challenge of protecting critical 
infrastructures from computer-based attacks extends well beyond federal 
operations. It spans the entire spectrum of our national, as well as the 
global, economy. Many critical infrastructure facilities are owned and 
operated by private companies whose continued secure operations are 
essential to the national welfare-as well as government services. As a 
result, establishing public-private partnerships has been recognized as one 
of the major challenges of critical infrastructure protection. 

The Year 2000 challenge has provided a basis on which to build by 
establishing relationships that can serve as the beginning of such 
partnerships. It was essential that Year 2000 issues be adequately addressed 
in arenas beyond the federal government: state and local governments, the 
public infrastructure, and other key economic sectors, such as financial 
services. This is because a single failure in one system could affect many 
others in our nation's complex array of public and private enterprises that 
have scores of system interdependencies at all levels. 

To address these concerns, we recommended in April 1998 that the 
President's Council on Year 2000 Conversion use a sector-based approach 
and establish the effective public-private partnerships necessary to address 
this issue.(26) The Council subsequently established over 25 sector-based 
working groups and has been initiating outreach activities since it became 
operational in Spring 1998. Similar sectors and agency focal points were 
designated by PDD 63. 

  ----------

  26 Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Potential for Widespread Disruption Calls for Strong 
  Leadership and Partnerships (GAO/AIMD-98-85, April 30, 1998). 

  ----------

In addition, the Chair of the President's Council has formed a Senior 
Advisors Group composed of representatives from private-sector firms 
across key economic sectors. Members of this group are expected to offer 
perspectives on crosscutting issues, information sharing, and appropriate 
federal responses to potential Year 2000 failures. In July 1999, the President 
directed establishment of a similar advisory group for critical 
infrastructure protection. The National Infrastructure Assurance Council, 
authorized by Executive Order 13130, is to have 30 members from private 
industry who are expected to be designated by late 1999. This new Council 
is to ``support a coordinated effort by both government and private sector 
entities to address threats to our Nation's critical infrastructure.'' It will be 
important for it to take advantage of the public-private relationships 
already established. 

Our April 1998 report also recommended that the President's Council on 
Year 2000 Conversion develop a comprehensive picture of the nation's Year 
2000 readiness that would identify and assess risks to the nation's key 
economic sectors-including risks posed by international links. In October 
1998, the Chair directed the Council's sector working groups to begin 
assessing their sectors. Accordingly, the Council and federal agencies have 
partnered with private-sector organizations, such as the North American 
Electric Reliability Council, to gather information critical to the nation's 
Year 2000 efforts and to address issues such as contingency planning. To 
date, the Council has issued three national assessments, most recently on 
August 5, 1999. These assessment reports have substantially increased the 
nation's understanding of the Year 2000 readiness of key industries. A 
similar approach could be used to evaluate longer term risks to our critical 
infrastructures and provide much-needed pathways for information 
sharing. 

Facilitating Progress and Monitoring Performance 

Both the executive branch and the Congress have developed techniques to 
facilitate and monitor performance in addressing Year 2000 conversion 
efforts. During 1997, OMB instituted a quarterly reporting routine to 
facilitate monitoring of agency progress in making their critical systems 
Year 2000 compliant. Between mid-1997 and early 1999, OMB placed each 
of the 24 major agencies into one of three tiers according to OMB's 
judgment regarding each agency's progress as described in their quarterly 
reports. As yet, no such routine reporting mechanism exists to monitor 
agency performance in strengthening computer security or critical 
infrastructure protection. However, as discussed previously, the Critical 
Infrastructure Assurance Office is reviewing agency infrastructure 
protection plans. Once these plans are judged acceptable, it will be 
important to monitor their implementation on a regular basis. 

In addition, many congressional committees actively monitored progress 
by holding hearings to obtain information on the Year 2000 readiness of 
federal agencies, states, localities, and other important nonfederal entities, 
such as the securities industry. The House Subcommittee on Government 
Management, Information and Technology of the Committee on 
Government Reform developed a ``report card'' system for periodically 
grading agencies on their progress. 

In addition, to facilitate remediation at federal agencies, the Congress 
passed and the President signed the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency 
Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, which included $3.35 billion in 
contingent emergency funding for Year 2000 conversion activities. In 
commenting on a draft of this report, the Chairman of the President's 
Council on Year 2000 Conversion said that the availability of this funding 
was of great assistance to agencies during the last 15 months of their 
conversion efforts and allowed them to fund Year 2000 conversion needs 
discovered late in the process. The Chairman noted that the situation 
regarding information security is somewhat different because those efforts 
will be ongoing rather than tied to a known completion date. Accordingly, 
agencies should be able to plan to include in their budgets sufficient 
funding for information security. An alternative view was expressed by the 
Chairman of the CIO Council Subcommittee on Critical Infrastructure 
Protection who stated that CIOs would have serious problems 
implementing PDD 63 without supplemental funding similar to that 
provided to help resolve the Year 2000 problem. 

Developing an Incident Identification and Coordination Capability 

To monitor and report on events associated with the Year 2000 date 
rollover, the President directed establishment of an Information 
Coordination Center (ICC). The ICC is to serve as the federal government's 
central point for coordinating information provided during the Year 2000 
transition by government emergency operations centers and the private 
sector. The center will be staffed with subject matter experts detailed from 
federal agencies who will be expected to integrate data received into 
national and international status reports. In this and other ways, the ICC 
will be expected to highlight information of interest to individual agencies, 
provide information to the public, and respond to inquiries. 

It is currently too early to determine how successful the ICC will be. 
However, those involved in establishing it are discussing issues that are 
also pertinent to critical infrastructure protection, such as the amount and 
type of data the center needs to collect and how this data should be 
summarized and reported. 

Implementing Information Technology Management Improvements 

Addressing the Year 2000 problem has highlighted the importance of good 
information technology management and, to date, demonstrated that the 
government will likely approach future information technology challenges 
better prepared. The Year 2000 problem has resulted in many agencies 
taking charge of their information technology resources in much more 
active ways than they have in the past, from inventorying and prioritizing 
systems to implementing reliable processes and better controls. In 
particular, it has prompted some agencies to establish much-needed 
information technology policies in areas such as system configuration 
management, risk management, and software testing. In addition, Year 2000 
efforts have reinforced an understanding of the importance of consistent 
and persistent top management attention, which is essential to solving any 
intractable problem. For the Year 2000 problem, this has been illustrated by 
the work, to date, of the President's Council onYear 2000 Conversion and 
its senior-level chairman. Such attention from senior federal executives will 
be important to help ensure that information security and critical 
infrastructure protection are taken seriously at lower organizational levels 
and that security specialists have the resources they need to implement an 
effective program. 

According to officials at OMB, the Year 2000 problem also gave agency 
CIOs a ``crash course'' in how to accomplish projects. Many CIOs were 
relatively new in their positions, due to a requirement for agency CIOs in 
the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996. Expediting Year 2000 efforts required many 
of them to quickly gain an understanding of their agency's systems, work 
extensively with agency program managers and Chief Financial Officers, 
and become familiar with budgeting and financial management practices. 

Conclusions 

The challenges associated with the Year 2000 date conversion problem are 
examples of the broader and longer term challenges that our nation faces in 
protecting our computer-supported critical infrastructures from hostile 
attacks. While differences exist, many of the efforts that have been 
undertaken to manage and remedy the Year 2000 problem can also be 
applied to these longer term challenges. Through PDD 63, the executive 
branch has initiated steps to address critical infrastructure protection and 
encourage private-sector involvement. As these efforts continue, they can 
benefit from many of the experiences gained during the Year 2000 
conversion period. Some of these ``lessons'' are already apparent. However, 
it is likely that others will emerge as the Year 2000 transition period 
unfolds. Accordingly, we are making no recommendations at this time. 

Agency Comments 

We provided a draft of this report and solicited informal comments from a 
variety of officials who have been involved inYear 2000 and critical 
infrastructure protection efforts. We received oral and electronic mail 
comments from the Chairman of the Councilon Year 2000 Conversion; the 
Co-Chairs of the CIO Council's Security Committee, one of whom is Chair 
of the Subcommittee on Critical Infrastructure Protection; officials in the 
Critical Information Assurance Office; and numerous federal agency CIOs. 
Overall, these officials agreed with the points made in the report, and some 
provided supporting illustrations from their own experience. We have 
noted the most significant comments in applicable segments of the report. 

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of 
this report earlier, we will not distribute it until 5 days from the date of this 
report. At that time, we will send copies to Senator Christopher Dodd, 
Vice-Chairman of the Senate Special Committee on theYear 2000 
Technology Problem; Senator Fred Thompson, Chairman, and Senator 
Joseph Lieberman, Ranking Minority Member, Senate Committee on 
Governmental Affairs; Representative Steven Horn, Chairman, 
Subcommittee on Government Management, Information and Technology, 
House Committee on Government Reform; and Representative Constance 
Morella, Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Technology, House Committee on 
Science. In addition, we are providing copies to John Koskinen, Chairman 
of the President's Council on Year 2000 Conversion; Richard Clarke, 
National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter- 
Terrorism; the Honorable Jacob Lew, Director, Office of Management and 
Budget; John Tritak, Director, Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office; 
Michael Vatis, Director, National Infrastructure Protection Center, FBI; 
Deidre Lee and James Flyzik, Chair and Vice-Chair, respectively, of the CIO 
Council; and other interested parties. Copies will be made available to 
others upon request. 

If you have any questions on matters discussed in this letter, please contact 
me at (202) 512-2600, or Jack L. Brock, Director, Governmentwide and 
Defense Information Systems, at (202) 512-6240. 

Sincerely yours, 

Jeffrey C. Steinhoff 
Acting Assistant Comptroller General 

Appendix I 

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology AppendixI 

The objectives of our work were to (1) summarize our recent findings on 
computer security and critical infrastructure protection and (2) suggest 
improvements that build on lessons learned from the Year 2000 date 
conversion experience. 

To summarize our recent findings, we analyzed our reports on computer 
security issued during fiscal year 1999. In addition, we reviewed findings 
pertaining to computer security issues associated with the fiscal year 1998 
financial statement audits of the 24 federal departments and agencies 
covered by the CFO Act. These agencies account for 98 percent of the total 
reported federal net outlays for fiscal year 1998. In analyzing reported 
findings, we categorized them into six basic areas of general control as 
described by the Federal Information System Controls Audit Manual 
(FISCAM), which contains guidance for reviewing information system 
controls that affect the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of 
computerized data associated with federal agency operations. These six 
areas include entitywide security program management and planning, 
access control, application program change control, segregation of duties, 
operating systems security, and service continuity. We supplemented this 
analysis with information that we obtained by reviewing key reports and 
statements issued since 1994 on critical infrastructure protection. These 
reports and statements are cited in footnotes throughout this report. 

To develop suggested improvements that build on lessons learned from the 
Year 2000 conversion experience, we analyzed our reports issued since 
February 1997 on efforts to address the Year 2000 problem and met with 
key officials leading federal efforts related to the Year 2000 problem and 
critical infrastructure protection. These officials included the Director of 
the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office, the Chairman of the 
President's Council on Year 2000 Conversion, officials at the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation's National Infrastructure Protection Center, and 
policy analysts at the Office of Management and Budget involved in 
overseeing federal Year 2000 conversion efforts and information security. 

We provided a draft of this report and solicited informal comments from a 
variety of officials who have been involved inYear 2000 and critical 
infrastructure protection efforts. We received oral and electronic mail 
comments from the Chairman of the Councilon Year 2000 Conversion; the 
Co-Chairs of the CIO Council's Security Committee, one of whom is Chair 
of the Subcommittee on Critical Infrastructure Protection; and officials in 
the Critical Information Assurance Office. We considered these comments 
and noted the most signficant ones in pertinent segments of the report. 

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 

We performed the majority of our review during August and September 
1999 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. 

Appendix II 

GAO Reports and Testimonies Addressing Information Security Issues Since 
February 1996 

Federal Reserve Banks: Areas for Improvement in Computer Controls 
(GAO/AIMD-99-280, September 15, 1999). 

Information Security: NRC's Computer Intrusion Detection Capabilities 
(GAO/AIMD-99-273R, August 27, 1999). 

DOD Information Security: Serious Weaknesses Continue To Place Defense 
Operations at Risk (GAO/AIMD-99-107, August 26, 1999). 

Battlefield Automation: Opportunities to Improve the Army's Information 
Protection Effort (GAO/NSIAD-99-166, August 11, 1999). 

Information Security: Answers to Post-hearing Questions 
(GAO/AIMD-99-272R, August 9, 1999). 

Bureau of the Public Debt: Areas for Improvement in Computer Controls 
(GAO/AIMD-99-242, August 6, 1999). 

Information Security Risk Assessment: Practices of Leading Organizations 
(Exposure draft) (GAO/AIMD-99-139, August 1999). 

USDA Information Security: Weaknesses at National Finance Center 
Increase Risk of Fraud, Misuse, and Improper Disclosure 
(GAO/AIMD-99-227, July 30, 1999). 

Information Security: Recent Attacks on Federal Web Sites Underscore 
Need for Stronger Information Security Management (GAO/T-AIMD-99-223, 
June 24, 1999). 

VA Information Systems: The Austin Automation Center Has Made 
Progress in Improving Information System Controls (GAO/AIMD-99-161, 
June 8, 1999). 

Information Security: Many NASA Mission-Critical Systems Face Serious 
Risks (GAO/AIMD-99-47, May 20, 1999). 

Department of Energy: Key Factors Underlying Security Problems at DOE 
Facilities (GAO/T-RCED-99-159, April 20, 1999). 

Information Security: The Melissa Computer Virus Demonstrates Urgent 
Need for Stronger Protection over Systems and Sensitive Data 
(GAO/T-AIMD-99-146, April 15, 1999). 

Financial Audit: 1998 Financial Statements of the United States 
Government (GAO/AIMD-99-130, March 31, 1999). 

Securities Fraud: The Internet Poses Challenges to Regulators and 
Investors (GAO/T-GGD-99-34, March 22, 1999). 

IRS Systems Security: Although Significant Improvements Made, Tax 
Processing Operations and Data Still at Serious Risk (GAO/AIMD-99-38, 
December 14, 1998). 

Financial Management Service: Areas for Improvement in Computer 
Controls (GAO/AIMD-99-10, October 20, 1998). 
Federal Reserve Banks: Areas for Improvement in Computer Controls 
(GAO/AIMD-99-6, October 14, 1998). 

Bureau of the Public Debt: Areas for Improvement in Computer Controls 
(GAO/AIMD-99-2, October 14, 1998). 

Financial Management: Improvements Needed in Air Force Vendor 
Payment Systems and Controls (GAO/AIMD-98-274, September 28, 1998). 

Information Security: SeriousWeaknesses Place Critical Federal 
Operations and Assets at Risk (GAO/AIMD-98-92, September 23, 1998). 

Information Security: Strengthened Management Needed to Protect 
Critical Federal Operations and Assets (GAO/T-AIMD-98-312, 
September 23, 1998). 

VA Information Systems: Computer ControlWeaknesses Increase Risk of 
Fraud, Misuse and Improper Disclosure (GAO/AIMD-98-175, September 23, 
1998). 

Defense Information Superiority: Progress Made, but Significant 
Challenges Remain (GAO/NSIAD/AIMD-98-257, August 31, 1998). 
FAA Systems: Serious Challenges Remain in Resolving Year 2000 and 
Computer Security Problems (GAO/T-AIMD-98-251, August 6, 1998). 

DOD's Information Assurance Efforts (GAO/NSIAD-98-132R, June 11, 
1998). 

Information Security: SeriousWeaknesses Put State Department andFAA 
Operations at Risk (GAO/T-AIMD-98-170, May 19, 1998). 

Computer Security: Pervasive, Serious Weaknesses Jeopardize State 
Department Operations (GAO/AIMD-98-145, May 18, 1998). 

Air Traffic Control: Weak Computer Security Practices Jeopardize Flight 
Safety (GAO/AIMD-98-155, May 18, 1998). 

Executive Guide: Information Security Management: Learning From 
Leading Organizations (GAO/AIMD-98-68, May 1998). 

U.S. Government Financial Statements: Results of GAO's Fiscal Year 1997 
Audit (GAO/T-AIMD-98-128, April 1, 1998). 

Financial Audit: 1997 Consolidated Financial Statements of the United 
States Government (GAO/AIMD-98-127, March 31, 1998). 

Financial Audit: Examination of IRS' Fiscal Year 1996 Custodial Financial 
Statements (GAO/AIMD-98-18, December 24, 1997). 

Financial Management: Review of the Military Retirement Trust Fund's 
Actuarial Model and Related Computer Controls (GAO/AIMD-97-128, 
September 9, 1997). 

Financial Audit: Examination of IRS' Fiscal Year 1996 Administrative 
Financial Statements (GAO/AIMD-97-89, August 29, 1997). 

Small Business Administration: Better Planning and Controls Needed for 
Information Systems (GAO/AIMD-97-94, June 27, 1997). 

Social Security Administration: Internet Access to Personal Earnings and 
Benefits Information (GAO/T-AIMD/HEHS-97-123, May 6, 1997). 

Budget Process: Comments on S.261-Biennial Budgeting and 
Appropriations Act (GAO/T-AIMD-97-84, April 23, 1997). 

IRS Systems Security and Funding: Employee Browsing Not Being 
Addressed Effectively and Budget Requests for New Systems Development 
Not Justified (GAO/T-AIMD-97-82, April 15, 1997). 

IRS Systems Security: Tax Processing Operations and Data Still at Risk Due 
to Serious Weaknesses (GAO/T-AIMD-97-76, April 10, 1997). 

IRS Systems Security: Tax Processing Operations and Data Still at Risk Due 
to Serious Weaknesses (GAO/AIMD-97-49, April 8, 1997). 

High Risk Series: Information Management and Technology (GAO/HR-97-9, 
February 1997). 

Information Security: Opportunities for Improved OMB Oversight of 
Agency Practices (GAO/AIMD-96-110, September 24, 1996). 

Financial Audit: Examination of IRS' Fiscal Year 1995 Financial Statements 
(GAO/AIMD-96-101, July 11, 1996). 

Tax Systems Modernization: Actions Underway But IRS Has Not Yet 
Corrected Management and Technical Weaknesses (GAO/AIMD-96-106, 
June 7, 1996). 

Information Security: Computer Hacker Information Available on the 
Internet (GAO/T-AIMD-96-108, June 5, 1996). 

Information Security: Computer Attacks at Department of Defense Pose 
Increasing Risks (GAO/AIMD-96-84, May 22, 1996). 

Information Security: Computer Attacks at Department of Defense Pose 
Increasing Risks (GAO/T-AIMD-96-92, May 22, 1996). 

Security Weaknesses at IRS' Cyberfile Data Center (GAO/AIMD-96-85R, 
May 9, 1996). 

Tax Systems Modernization: Management and Technical Weaknesses Must 
Be Overcome To Achieve Success (GAO/T-AIMD-96-75, March 26, 1996). 

Financial Audit: Federal Family Education Loan Program's Financial 
Statements for Fiscal Years 1994 and 1993 (GAO/AIMD-96-22, February 26, 
1996). 

Appendix III 

GAO Reports and Testimonies Addressing the Year 2000 Challenge 

Copies of these products are available through GAO's home page on the 
Internet's World Wide Web (http://www.gao.gov). Copies may also be 
obtained at GAO's Document Distribution Center (700 4th St., NW Room 
1100) or by phone (202-512-6000) or fax (202-512-6061). 

Year 2000 Computing Challenge: Status of the District of Columbia's Efforts 
to Renovate Systems and Develop Contingency and Continuity Plans 
(GAO/T-AIMD-99-297, September 24, 1999). 

Year 2000 Computing Challenge: The District of Columbia Cannot Reliably 
Track Y2K Costs (GAO/T-AIMD-99-298, September 24, 1999). 

Reported Year 2000 (Y2K) Readiness Status of 25 Large School Districts 
(GAO/AIMD-99-296R, September 21, 1999). 

IRS' Year 2000 Efforts: Actions Are Under Way to Help Ensure That 
Contingency Plans Are Complete and Consistent (GAO/GGD-99-176, 
September 14, 1999). 

Year 2000 Computing Challenge: FAA Continues to Make Important Strides, 
But Vulnerabilities Remain (GAO/T-AIMD-99-285, September 9, 1999). 

Year 2000 Computing Challenge: SBA Needs to Strengthen Systems Testing 
to Ensure Readiness (GAO/AIMD-99-265, August 27, 1999). 

Nuclear Weapons: Year 2000 Status of the Nation's Nuclear Weapons 
Stockpile (GAO/RCED-99-272R, August 20, 1999). 

Year 2000 Computing Challenge: Readiness Improving Yet Essential 
Actions Remain to Ensure Delivery of Critical Services 
(GAO/T-AIMD-99-268, August 17, 1999). 

Year 2000 Computing Challenge: Important Progress Made, But Much Work 
Remains to Avoid Disruption of Critical Services (GAO/T-AIMD-99-267, 
August 14, 1999). 

Year 2000 Computing Challenge: Important Progress Made, Yet Much Work 
Remains to Ensure Delivery of Critical Services (GAO/T-AIMD-99-266, 
August 13, 1999). 

Year 2000 Computing Challenge: Agencies' Reporting of Mission-Critical 
Classified Systems (GAO/AIMD-99-218, August 5, 1999). 

Social Security Administration: Update on Year 2000 and Other Key 
Information Technology Initiatives (GAO/T-AIMD-99-259, July 29, 1999). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Status of Medicare Providers Unknown 
(GAO/AIMD-99-243, July 28, 1999). 

Reported Y2K status of the 21 Largest U.S. Cities (GAO/AIMD-99-246R, 
July 15, 1999). 

Year 2000 Computing Challenge: Federal Efforts to Ensure Continued 
Delivery of Key State-Administered Benefits (GAO/T-AIMD-99-241, July 15, 
1999). 

Emergency and State and Local Law Enforcement Systems: Committee 
Questions Concerning Year 2000 Challenges (GAO/AIMD-99-247R, July 14, 
1999). 

Year 2000 Computing Challenge: Important Progress Made, Yet Much Work 
Remains to Avoid Disruption of Critical Services (GAO/T-AIMD-99-234, 
July 9, 1999). 

Year 2000 Computing Challenge: Readiness Improving Yet Avoiding 
Disruption of Critical Services Will Require Additional Work 
(GAO/T-AIMD-99-233, July 8, 1999). 

Year 2000 Computing Challenge: Readiness Improving But Much Work 
Remains to Avoid Disruption of Critical Services (GAO/T-AIMD-99-232, 
July 7, 1999). 

Defense Computers: Management Controls Are Critical To Effective Year 
2000 Testing (GAO/AIMD-99-172, June 30, 1999). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Customs is Making Good Progress 
(GAO/T-AIMD-99-225, June 29, 1999). 

Year 2000 Computing Challenge: Delivery of Key Benefits Hinges on States' 
Achieving Compliance (GAO/T-AIMD/GGD-99-221, June 23, 1999). 

Year 2000 Computing Challenge: Estimated Costs, Planned Uses of 
Emergency Funding, and Future Implications (GAO/T-AIMD-99-214, 
June 22, 1999). 

GSA's Effort to Develop Year 2000 Business Continuity and Contingency 
Plans for Telecommunications Systems (GAO/AIMD-99-201R, June 16, 
1999). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Actions Needed to Ensure Continued Delivery 
of Veterans Benefits and Health Care Services (GAO/AIMD-99-190R, 
June 11, 1999). 

Year 2000 Computing Challenge: Concerns About Compliance Information 
on Biomedical Equipment (GAO/T-AIMD-99-209, June 10, 1999). 

Year 2000 Computing Challenge: Much Biomedical Equipment Status 
Information Available, Yet Concerns Remain (GAO/T-AIMD-99-197, May 25, 
1999). 

Year 2000 Computing Challenge: OPM Has Made Progress on Business 
Continuity Planning (GAO/GGD-99-66, May 24, 1999). 

VA Y2K Challenges: Responses to Post-Testimony Questions 
(GAO/AIMD-99-199R, May 24, 1999). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: USDA Needs to Accelerate Time Frames for 
Completing Contingency Planning (GAO/AIMD-99-178, May 21, 1999). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Readiness of the Oil and Gas Industries 
(GAO/AIMD-99-162, May 19, 1999). 

Year 2000 Computing Challenge: Time Issues Affecting the Global 
Positioning System (GAO/T-AIMD-99-187, May 12, 1999). 

Year 2000 Computing Challenge: Education Taking Needed Actions But 
Work Remains (GAO/T-AIMD-99-180, May 12, 1999). 

Year 2000 Computing Challenge: Labor Has Progressed But Selected 
Systems Remain at Risk (GAO/T-AIMD-99-179, May 12, 1999). 

Year 2000: State Insurance Regulators Face Challenges in Determining 
Industry Readiness (GAO/GGD-99-87, April 30, 1999). 

Year 2000 Computing Challenge: Status of Emergency and State and Local 
Law Enforcement Systems Is Still Unknown (GAO/T-AIMD-99-163, April 29, 
1999). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Costs and Planned Use of Emergency Funds 
(GAO/AIMD-99-154, April 28, 1999). 

Year 2000: Financial Institution and Regulatory Efforts to Address 
International Risks (GAO/GGD-99-62, April 27, 1999). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Readiness of Medicare and the Health Care 
Sector (GAO/T-AIMD-99-160, April 27, 1999). 

U.S. Postal Service: Subcommittee Questions Concerning Year 2000 
Challenges Facing the Service (GAO/AIMD-99-150R, April 23, 1999). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Status of the Water Industry 
(GAO/AIMD-99-151, April 21, 1999). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Key Actions Remain to Ensure Delivery of 
Veterans Benefits and Health Services (GAO/T-AIMD-99-152, April 20, 
1999). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Readiness Improving But Much Work Remains 
To Ensure Delivery of Critical Services (GAO/T-AIMD-99-149, April 19, 
1999). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Action Needed to Ensure Continued Delivery 
of Veterans Benefits and Health Care Services (GAO/T-AIMD-99-136, 
April 15, 1999). 

Year 2000 Computing Challenge: Federal Government Making Progress But 
Critical Issues Must Still Be Addressed to Minimize Disruptions 
(GAO/T-AIMD-99-144, April 14, 1999). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Additional Work Remains to Ensure Delivery 
of Critical Services (GAO/T-AIMD-99-143, April 13, 1999). 

Tax Administration: IRS' Fiscal Year 2000 Budget Request and 1999 Tax 
Filing Season (GAO/T-GGD/AIMD-99-140, April 13, 1999). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Federal Reserve Has Established Effective 
Year 2000 Management Controls for Internal Systems Conversion 
(GAO/AIMD-99-78, April 9, 1999). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Readiness of the Electric Power Industry 
(GAO/AIMD-99-114, April 6, 1999). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Customs Has Established Effective Year 2000 
Program Controls (GAO/AIMD-99-37, March 29, 1999). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: FAA Is Making Progress But Important 
Challenges Remain (GAO/T-AIMD/RCED-99-118, March 15, 1999). 

Insurance Industry: Regulators Are Less Active in Encouraging and 
Validating Year 2000 Preparedness (GAO/T-GGD-99-56, March 11, 1999). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Defense Has Made Progress, But Additional 
Management Controls Are Needed (GAO/T-AIMD-99-101, March 2, 1999). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Readiness Status of the Department of Health 
and Human Services (GAO/T-AIMD-99-92, February 26, 1999). 

Defense Information Management: Continuing Implementation Challenges 
Highlight the Need for Improvement (GAO/T-AIMD-99-93, February 25, 
1999). 

IRS' Year 2000 Efforts: Status and Remaining Challenges 
(GAO/T-GGD-99-35, February 24, 1999). 

Department of Commerce: National Weather Service Modernization and 
NOAA Fleet Issues (GAO/T-AIMD/GGD-99-97, February 24, 1999). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Medicare and the Delivery of Health Services 
Are at Risk (GAO/T-AIMD-99-89, February 24, 1999). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Readiness of State Automated Systems That 
Support Federal Human Services Programs (GAO/T-AIMD-99-91, 
February 24, 1999). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Customs Is Effectively Managing Its Year 2000 
Program (GAO/T-AIMD-99-85, February 24, 1999). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Update on the Readiness of the Social Security 
Administration (GAO/T-AIMD-99-90, February 24, 1999). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Challenges Still Facing the U.S. Postal Service 
(GAO/T-AIMD-99-86, February 23, 1999). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: The District of Columbia Remains Behind 
Schedule (GAO/T-AIMD-99-84, February 19, 1999). 

High-Risk Series: An Update (GAO/HR-99-1, January 1999). 
Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Status of Airports' Efforts to Deal With Date 

Change Problem (GAO/RCED/AIMD-99-57, January 29, 1999). 

Defense Computers: DOD's Plan for Execution of SimulatedYear 2000 
Exercises (GAO/AIMD-99-52R, January 29, 1999). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Status of Bureau of Prisons' Year 2000 Efforts 
(GAO/AIMD-99-23, January 27, 1999). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Readiness Improving, But Much Work 
Remains to Avoid Major Disruptions (GAO/T-AIMD-99-50, January 20, 
1999). 

Year 2000 Computing Challenge: Readiness Improving, But Critical Risks 
Remain (GAO/T-AIMD-99-49, January 20, 1999). 

Status Information: FAA's Year 2000 Business Continuity and Contingency 
Planning Efforts Are Ongoing (GAO/AIMD-99-40R, December 4, 1998). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: A Testing Guide (GAO/AIMD-10.1.21, 
November 1998). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Readiness of State Automated Systems to 
Support Federal Welfare Programs (GAO/AIMD-99-28, November 6, 1998). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Status of Efforts to Deal With Personnel Issues 
(GAO/AIMD/GGD-99-14, October 22, 1998). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Updated Status of Department of Education's 
Information Systems (GAO/T-AIMD-99-8, October 8, 1998). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: The District of Columbia Faces Tremendous 
Challenges in Ensuring That Vital Services Are Not Disrupted 
(GAO/T-AIMD-99-4, October 2, 1998). 

Medicare Computer Systems: Year 2000 Challenges Put Benefits and 
Services in Jeopardy (GAO/AIMD-98-284, September 28, 1998). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Leadership Needed to Collect and Disseminate 
Critical Biomedical Equipment Information (GAO/T-AIMD-98-310, 
September 24, 1998). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Compliance Status of Many Biomedical 
Equipment Items Still Unknown (GAO/AIMD-98-240, September 18, 1998). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Significant Risks Remain to Department of 
Education's Student Financial Aid Systems (GAO/T-AIMD-98-302, 
September 17, 1998). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Progress Made at Department of Labor, But 
Key Systems at Risk (GAO/T-AIMD-98-303, September 17, 1998). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Federal Depository Institution Regulators Are 
Making Progress, But Challenges Remain (GAO/T-AIMD-98-305, 
September 17, 1998). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Federal Reserve Is Acting to Ensure Financial 
Institutions Are Fixing Systems But Challenges Remain 
(GAO/AIMD-98-248, September 17, 1998). 

Responses to Questions on FAA's Computer Security and Year 2000 
Program (GAO/AIMD-98-301R, September 14, 1998). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Severity of Problem Calls for Strong 
Leadership and Effective Partnerships (GAO/T-AIMD-98-278, September 3, 
1998). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Strong Leadership and Effective Partnerships 
Needed to Reduce Likelihood of Adverse Impact (GAO/T-AIMD-98-277, 
September 2, 1998). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Strong Leadership and Effective Partnerships 
Needed to Mitigate Risks (GAO/T-AIMD-98-276, September 1, 1998). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: State Department Needs To Make 
Fundamental Improvements To Its Year 2000 Program (GAO/AIMD-98-162, 
August 28, 1998). 

Year 2000 Computing: EFT 99 Is Not Expected to Affect Year 2000 
Remediation Efforts (GAO/AIMD-98-272R, August 28, 1998). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Progress Made in Compliance of VA Systems, 
But Concerns Remain (GAO/AIMD-98-237, August 21, 1998). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Avoiding Major Disruptions Will Require 
Strong Leadership and Effective Partnerships (GAO/T-AIMD-98-267, 
August 19, 1998). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Strong Leadership and Partnerships Needed to 
Address Risk of Major Disruptions (GAO/T-AIMD-98-266, August 17, 1998). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Strong Leadership and Partnerships Needed to 
Mitigate Risk of Major Disruptions (GAO/T-AIMD-98-262, August 13, 1998). 

FAA Systems: Serious Challenges Remain in Resolving Year 2000 and 
Computer Security Problems (GAO/T-AIMD-98-251, August 6, 1998). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Business Continuity and Contingency Planning 
(GAO/AIMD-10.1.19, August 1998). 

Internal Revenue Service: Impact of the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act 
on Year 2000 Efforts (GAO/GGD-98-158R, August 4, 1998). 

Social Security Administration: Subcommittee Questions Concerning 
Information Technology Challenges Facing the Commissioner 
(GAO/AIMD-98-235R, July 10, 1998). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Actions Needed on Electronic Data Exchanges 
(GAO/AIMD-98-124, July 1, 1998). 

Defense Computers: Year 2000 Computer Problems Put Navy Operations At 
Risk (GAO/AIMD-98-150, June 30, 1998). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Testing and Other Challenges Confronting 
Federal Agencies (GAO/T-AIMD-98-218, June 22, 1998). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Telecommunications Readiness Critical, Yet 
Overall Status Largely Unknown (GAO/T-AIMD-98-212, June 16, 1998). 

GAO Views on Year 2000 Testing Metrics (GAO/AIMD-98-217R, June 16, 
1998). 

IRS' Year 2000 Efforts: Business Continuity Planning Needed for Potential 
Year 2000 System Failures (GAO/GGD-98-138, June 15, 1998). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Actions Must Be Taken Now to Address Slow 
Pace of Federal Progress (GAO/T-AIMD-98-205, June 10, 1998). 

Defense Computers: Army Needs to Greatly Strengthen Its Year 2000 
Program (GAO/AIMD-98-53, May 29, 1998). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: USDA Faces Tremendous Challenges in 
Ensuring That Vital Public Services Are Not Disrupted 
(GAO/T-AIMD-98-167, May 14, 1998). 

Securities Pricing: Actions Needed for Conversion to Decimals 
(GAO/T-GGD-98-121, May 8, 1998). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Continuing Risks of Disruption to Social 
Security, Medicare, and Treasury Programs (GAO/T-AIMD-98-161, May 7, 
1998). 

IRS' Year 2000 Efforts: Status and Risks (GAO/T-GGD-98-123, May 7, 1998). 

Air Traffic Control: FAA Plans to Replace Its Host Computer System 
Because Future Availability Cannot Be Assured (GAO/AIMD-98-138R, 
May 1, 1998). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Potential for Widespread Disruption Calls for 
Strong Leadership and Partnerships (GAO/AIMD-98-85, April 30, 1998). 

Defense Computers: Year 2000 Computer Problems Threaten DOD 
Operations (GAO/AIMD-98-72, April 30, 1998). 

Department of the Interior: Year 2000 Computing Crisis Presents Risk of 
Disruption to Key Operations (GAO/T-AIMD-98-149, April 22, 1998). 

Tax Administration: IRS' Fiscal Year 1999 Budget Request and Fiscal Year 
1998 Filing Season (GAO/T-GGD/AIMD-98-114, March 31, 1998). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Strong Leadership Needed to Avoid Disruption 
of Essential Services (GAO/T-AIMD-98-117, March 24, 1998). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Federal Regulatory Efforts to Ensure Financial 
Institution Systems Are Year 2000 Compliant (GAO/T-AIMD-98-116, 
March 24, 1998). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Office of Thrift Supervision's Efforts to Ensure 
Thrift Systems Are Year 2000 Compliant (GAO/T-AIMD-98-102, March 18, 
1998). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Strong Leadership and Effective Public/Private 
Cooperation Needed to Avoid Major Disruptions (GAO/T-AIMD-98-101, 
March 18, 1998). 

Post-Hearing Questions on the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's 
Year 2000 (Y2K) Preparedness (GAO/AIMD-98-108R, March 18, 1998). 

SEC Year 2000 Report: Future Reports Could Provide More Detailed 
Information (GAO/GGD/AIMD-98-51, March 6, 1998). 

Year 2000 Readiness: NRC's Proposed Approach Regarding Nuclear 
Powerplants (GAO/AIMD-98-90R, March 6, 1998). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's 
Efforts to Ensure Bank Systems Are Year 2000 Compliant 
(GAO/T-AIMD-98-73, February 10, 1998). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: FAA Must Act Quickly to Prevent Systems 
Failures (GAO/T-AIMD-98-63, February 4, 1998). 

FAA Computer Systems: Limited Progress onYear 2000 Issue Increases 
Risk Dramatically (GAO/AIMD-98-45, January 30, 1998). 

Defense Computers: Air Force Needs to StrengthenYear 2000 Oversight 
(GAO/AIMD-98-35, January 16, 1998). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Actions Needed to Address Credit Union 
Systems' Year 2000 Problem (GAO/AIMD-98-48, January 7, 1998). 

Veterans Health Administration Facility Systems: Some Progress Made In 
Ensuring Year 2000 Compliance, But Challenges Remain 
(GAO/AIMD-98-31R, November 7, 1997). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: National Credit Union Administration's Efforts 
to Ensure Credit Union Systems Are Year 2000 Compliant 
(GAO/T-AIMD-98-20, October 22, 1997). 

Social Security Administration: Significant Progress Made in Year 2000 
Effort, But Key Risks Remain (GAO/AIMD-98-6, October 22, 1997). 

Defense Computers: Technical Support Is Key to Naval Supply Year 2000 
Success (GAO/AIMD-98-7R, October 21, 1997). 

Defense Computers: LSSC Needs to Confront Significant Year 2000 Issues 
(GAO/AIMD-97-149, September 26, 1997). 

Veterans Affairs Computer Systems: Action Underway Yet Much Work 
Remains To Resolve Year 2000 Crisis (GAO/T-AIMD-97-174, September 25, 
1997). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Success Depends Upon Strong Management 
and Structured Approach (GAO/T-AIMD-97-173, September 25, 1997). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: An Assessment Guide (GAO/AIMD-10.1.14, 
September 1997). 

Defense Computers: SSG Needs to SustainYear 2000 Progress 
(GAO/AIMD-97-120R, August 19, 1997). 

Defense Computers: Improvements to DOD Systems Inventory Needed for 
Year 2000 Effort (GAO/AIMD-97-112, August 13, 1997). 

Defense Computers: Issues Confronting DLA in Addressing Year 2000 
Problems (GAO/AIMD-97-106, August 12, 1997). 

Defense Computers: DFAS Faces Challenges in Solving the Year 2000 
Problem (GAO/AIMD-97-117, August 11, 1997). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Time is Running Out for Federal Agencies to 
Prepare for the New Millennium (GAO/T-AIMD-97-129, July 10, 1997). 

Veterans Benefits Computer Systems: Uninterrupted Delivery of Benefits 
Depends on Timely Correction of Year-2000 Problems 
(GAO/T-AIMD-97-114, June 26, 1997). 

Veterans Benefits Computer Systems: Risks of VBA's Year-2000 Efforts 
(GAO/AIMD-97-79, May 30, 1997). 

Medicare Transaction System: Success Depends Upon Correcting Critical 
Managerial and Technical Weaknesses (GAO/AIMD-97-78, May 16, 1997). 

Medicare Transaction System: Serious Managerial and Technical 
Weaknesses Threaten Modernization (GAO/T-AIMD-97-91, May 16, 1997). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Risk of Serious Disruption to Essential 
Government Functions Calls for Agency Action Now (GAO/T-AIMD-97-52, 
February 27, 1997). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Strong Leadership Today Needed To Prevent 
Future Disruption of Government Services (GAO/T-AIMD-97-51, 
February 24, 1997). 

High-Risk Series: Information Management andTechnology (GAO/HR-97-9, 
February 1997). 

Appendix IV 

Risks to Computer-Supported Operations

(Based on a list developed by the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology and included in An Introduction to Computer Security: The 
NIST Handbook, Special Publication 800-12, December 1995.) 

. Malicious hackers, those who break into computers without 
authorization, are especially troubling because their identity and 
purpose are unknown. In recent years, there has been growing concern 
that hackers, especially those working on behalf of hostile foreign 
governments or terrorists, could cause devastating disruptions and 
damage to computer-dependent operations and infrastructures. 

. Malicious code, such as viruses, worms, Trojan horses, and logic bombs, 
can cause serious damage and disruption and can be costly to 
remediate. This was recently illustrated by the Melissa virus. 

. Errors and omissions in data entry are an important threat to data and 
system integrity. These errors are caused not only by data entry clerks 
processing hundreds of transactions per day, but also by all types of 
users who create and edit data. 

. Software programming and development errors can range in severity 
from benign to catastrophic. 

. Installation and maintenance errors can introduce significant security 
vulnerabilities. 

. Criminals intent on fraud and theft can exploit computer systems by 
automating traditional methods of fraud and by using new methods. 
Systems that control access to resources, such as inventory systems, are 
particular targets. 

. Employee sabotage can cause especially serious problems because the 
employee, or ex-employee, may have detailed knowledge of system 
operations and vulnerabilities. Such sabotage may include destroying 
hardware or facilities, planting logic bombs that destroy software 
programs or data, ``crashing'' systems, or holding encrypted data 
``hostage.'' 

. Foreign government espionage efforts, while often thought of as 
targeting classified systems, may also target unclassified systems to gain 
information on topics such as travel plans of senior officials, civil 
defense and emergency preparedness, manufacturing technologies, 
satellite data, personnel and payroll data, and law enforcement, 
investigative, and security files. 

. Threats to personal privacy are of concern because computers now 
accumulate vast amounts of electronic information about individuals by 
governments, credit bureaus, and private companies. In several cases, 
federal and state employees have sold personal information to private 
investigators or other ``information brokers.'' 

. Industrial espionage can be perpetrated either by companies seeking to 
improve their competitive advantage or by governments seeking to aid 
their domestic industries. 

Appendix V 

Examples of Information Security Weaknesses Reported by GAO for Federal 
Agencies During Fiscal Year 1999

In May 1999, we reported that, as part of our tests of the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) computer-based controls, 
we successfully penetrated several mission-critical systems. Having 
obtained access, we could have disrupted NASA's ongoing command and 
control operations and stolen, modified, or destroyed system software and 
data.(1)

In December 1998, we reported that weaknesses in Internal Revenue 
Service's (IRS) computer security controls continued to place IRS' 
automated systems and taxpayer data at serious risk to both internal and 
external threats that could result in the denial of computer services or in 
the unauthorized disclosure, modification, or destruction of taxpayer data.(2)

In August 1999, we reported that serious weaknesses in DOD information 
security continue to provide both hackers and hundreds of thousands of 
authorized users the opportunity to modify, steal, inappropriately disclose, 
and destroy sensitive DOD data. These weaknesses impair DOD's ability to 
(1) control physical and electronic access to its systems and data, 
(2) ensure that software running on its systems is properly authorized, 
tested, and functioning as intended, (3) limit employees' ability to perform 
incompatible functions, and (4) resume operations in the event of a 
disaster. As a result, numerous Defense functions, including weapons and 
supercomputer research, logistics, finance, procurement, personnel 
management, military health, and payroll, have already been adversely 
affected by system attacks or fraud.(3) 

  ----------

  1 Information Security: Many NASA Mission-Critical Systems Face Serious Risks 
  (GAO/AIMD-99-47, May 20, 1999). 

  2 IRS Systems Security: Although Significant Improvements Made, Tax Processing 
  Operations and Data Still at Serious Risk (GAO/AIMD-99-38, December 14, 1998). 

  3 DOD Information Security: SeriousWeaknesses Continue to Place Defense Operations at 
  Risk (GAO/AIMD-99-107, August 26, 1999). 

  ----------

In July 1999, we reported that the Department of Agriculture's (USDA) 
National Finance Center (NFC) had serious access control weaknesses that 
affected its ability to prevent and/or detect unauthorized changes to payroll 
and other payment data or computer software. NFC develops and operates 
administrative and financial systems, including payroll/personnel, property 
management, and accounting systems for both the USDA and more than 60 
other federal organizations. During fiscal year 1998, NFC processed more 
than $19 billion in payroll payments for more than 450,000 federal 
employees. NFC is also responsible for maintaining records for the world's 
largest 401(k)-type program, the federal Thrift Savings Program. This 
program, which is growing at about $1 billion per month, covers about 
2.3 million employees and totaled more than $60 billion as of September 30, 
1998.(4) The weaknesses we identified increased the risk that users could 
cause improper payments and that sensitive information could be misused, 
improperly disclosed, or destroyed. 

In October 1998, we reported that general computer controls at the 
Department of Treasury's Financial Management Service and its contractor 
data centers placed the data maintained in its financial systems at 
significant risk of unauthorized modification, disclosure, loss, or 
impairment. As a result, billions of dollars of payments and collections 
were at risk of fraud.(5)

  ----------

  4 USDA Information Security: Weaknesses at National Finance Center Increase Risk of 
  Fraud, Misuse, and Improper Disclosure (GAO/AIMD-99-227, July 30, 1999). 

  5 Financial Management Service: Areas for Improvement in Computer Controls 
  (GAO/AIMD-99-10, October 20, 1998). 

  ----------